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LIABILITY OF SKI AREA OPERATORS
By DAVID WELLS*
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years the sport of skiing has become increasingly
popular. As is true of all sports, it has its concommitant legal diffi-
culties. It is difficult to fully explore any one aspect of legal
liability in a skiing context due to the dearth of reported decisions.
Although there are many problems involving legal liability in
a skiing setting, the purpose of this article is to explore and discuss
one limited facet of liability, namely, the liability of a ski area to
its patrons, taking into consideration the law as it has been applied
in businesses similarly situated.
II. ACCIDENTS CAUSED BY OBJECTS IN A SKI TRAIL
One of the most common causes of ski accidents is the tree
stump or rock on a main ski trail, partially covered by snow. For
purposes of discussion, suppose P, an intermediate skier who has
skied at a particular ski area throughout the day, is injured late in
the afternoon by a collision with a rock. The rock which caused
P's injury was exposed on the downhill side of a mogul, not visible
to an approaching skier until he is upon it and unable to avoid it.
Let us assume further that this ski area, as is the custom in
the industry, provides a salaried Ski Patrol charged with the re-
sponsibility, among other things, of searching out exposed dangers
on main ski trails and warning skiers of those defects which have
been discovered and cannot be corrected. The evidence also shows
there were a half dozen such bare spots on the trail, which had
remained in this condition all day. No devices had been erected at
the point of P's injury warning of the condition. P, while he had
skied the trail throughout the day, was unaware of the defect which
caused his injury, not having seen it. The area operator has provided
a "T-bar" ski lift to transport skiers to the top of the mountain.
In this situation, will P be able to recover damages from the ski
area operator?
A. Legal Relationship of the Parties
Preliminary to a discussion of the issue posed in this hypotheti-
cal situation, P's status or legal relation to the ski area operator
must be determined. Is P, when he has paid consideration for the
use of the ski area and its facilities, to be classified as a licensee
or an invitee?
Two fundamental tests have been advanced to determine
whether or not an individual is an invitee of the occupier of the
premises.1 The first such test is known as the "Economic Bene-
fit Test" wherein an individual enters the premises of another,
commonly called the occupier, with a view towards benefitting him-
self in some way and which also brings at least a potential pecuni-
* Attorney at Law, Boulder, Colorado.
I Harper and James, Law of Torts, 1478, § 27.12 (1956).
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ary profit to the occupier.2 The second theory is commonly re-
ferred to as the "Invitation" or "Representation" test.3 The basis
for liability under this view is not economic benefit to the occupier,
but an implied representation that reasonable care has been exer-
cised to make the premises safe for the invitee, and to encourage his
entrance.
Where the invitee relationship is found, the courts have im-
posed upon the occupier a duty to protect the invitee from all
known dangers on the premises, as well as those which, through the
exercise of reasonable care, the occupier could discover.4 There is
no duty, however, to warn the invitee of obvious or apparent
dangers which he may reasonably be expected to discover and
guard against.5 It is generally held that the mere existence of a
dangerous condition is not sufficient to hold the occupier liable; it
must also be shown that this condition existed for such a period of
time that through the exercise of reasonable care it would have
been discovered."
Some authorities state that as a matter of law a warning is
adequate to enable the invitee to avoid the harm and thereby re-
lieve the occupier of liability.7 This position has been attacked as
unsound in both policy and principle.8 It would seem that while
warnings may not relieve the occupier of liability as a matter of
law, such signs or statements are important in determining whether
the invitee was aware of the dangerous condition which caused his
injury.
Most people who go to ski areas do so with the intention of
participating in the sport of skiing and through this derive some
benefit. Hand in hand with this is the fact that ski areas are con-
structed to accommodate the skier, meet his demands and through
this, derive a profit. In the eyes of the law this confers upon the
skier the status of invitee to the ski area operator, and it has been
so held in Wright v. Mt. Mansfield Lift, Inc.,9 Kaufman v. State,10
and Morse v. State,1 all of which involved ski mishaps.
The imposition of the invitee status upon the parties places a
duty upon the occupier to warn its invitee of all known dangers on
the premises which the occupier could reasonably be expected to
discover. Applying this principle to the hypothetical situation, it
would seem that the occupier had-notice of, or through the exercise
of reasonable care on his part, should have known of the injury
producing defect. In addition, the area operator recognized it had a
duty in this regard and in response thereto employed a Ski Patrol
to warn of such defects. In the situation posed, there were no
warning devices erected indicating a defect existed, and on the
basis of this there would appear to be a breach of duty on the part
of the occupier toward his invitee.
One case presenting an obstacle to P's recovery in the hy-
2 Ibid.
3 Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees, 26 Minn. L. Rev. 573 (1942).
4 Restatement, Torts § 342 (a) (1934).
5 Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Nichols, 173 Tenn. 602, 118 S.W.2d 213 (1938).
6 Prosser, Law of Torts, § 78 (2d ed. 1955).
7 Restatement, Torts § 343 (c)(ii) (1934).
A Supra note 1.
9 96 F. Supp. 786 ID. Vt. 1951).
10 172 N.Y.S.2d 276, 142 N.Y.S.2d 52 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
1129 N.Y.S.2d 34, 262 App. Div. 324 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
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pothetical is Wright v. Mt. Mansfield Lift, Inc. 12 , which presented a
situation similar to the hypothetical. There, plaintiff, an inter-
mediate skier with two or three years skiing experience skied down
an intermediate trail. During her second run along one particular
trail, plaintiff, while in a 'snowplow" position and attempting to
stop, suddenly fell and was injured. The evidence showed the trail
at this point was of good width and relatively level. No tree stump
was visible above the surface of the snow and the snow cover was
smooth and adequate. One of the parties skiing with the plaintiff
brushed the snow aside where plaintiff had fallen and found a
tree stump 4" to 5" high from the ground. The court inferred from
this that the tree stump had caused plaintiff's fall, and ruled that
the plaintiff assumed the risk.
There is a good possibility P in the hypotheical could dis-
tinguish the Wright case from his situation in that the Wright case
involved a tree stump as the accident causing element, not visible
above the snow and not discoverable through the exercise of rea-
sonable care. In the hypothetical posed, the defect was clearly vis-
ible above the surface, although not visible to the approaching
skier. This defect was also discoverable through the exercise of
reasonable care, having existed for a period of sufficient duration.
B. Classification of a Skier's Proficiency
Does the imposition of the invitee status upon the skier place
a duty upon the occupier of premises to classify each skier ac-
cording to his degree of proficiency in the sport? In passing upon
this question, the New York Court of Claims in Vogel v. State,
13
stated:
It is a manifest impossibility for the operator of a
ski resort to oversee and classify for his own protection
the ability of every skier who may come to ski on his
slope. Consequently, he must rely on each skier being a
competent judge of his own abilities. Certainly, the operator
cannot be responsible for the broken neck of the novice,
who, over-estimating his competence, scorns the gentle
slopes and tries the ski jump.
14
This view finds support in the Wright case, wherein it was
stated:
Skiing is a sport; a sport that entices thousands of
people; a sport that requires an ability on the part of the
skier to handle himself or herself under various cir-
cumstances of grade, boundary, mid-trail obstructions,
corners and varied conditions of the snow. Secondly, it
requires good judgment on the part of the skier and
recognition of the existing circumstances and conditions.
Only the skier knows his own ability to cope with a cer-
tain piece of trail. Snow, ranging from powder to ice, can
be of infinite kinds. Breakable crust may be encountered
where soft snow is expected. Roots and rocks may be
hidden under a thin cover. A single thin stubble of cut
brush can trip a skier in the middle of a turn. Sticky
12 Supra note 9.
13 124 N.Y.S.2d 563, 204 Misc. 614 (Ct. CI. 1953).
14 Id. at 570.
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snow may follow a fast running surface without warning.
Skiing conditions may change quickly. What was, a short
time before, a perfect surface with a soft cover on all bumps
may fairly rapidly become filled with ruts, worn spots and
other manner of skier created hazards.
15
In light of the above discussion, there is rapidly growing
authority to the effect that there is no duty on a ski area operator
to classify the abilities of his skiing patrons. Consequently, P, in
the hypothetical, would likely be entitled to recover for his dam-
ages, unless he is held to have assumed the risk.
C. Assumption of Risk
Assumption of risk arises generally when a plaintiff either ex-
pressly consents to relieve the defendant of his duty of conduct
toward the plaintiff and thus take his chances, or impliedly as-
sumes the risk by voluntarily entering into such a relationship
with the defendant, giving an intelligent consent with full knowl-
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edge of the danger.16 The courts differ upon whether the plaintiff
must know and appreciate the particular danger,"7 or whether it is
sufficient if he merely knows such dangers inhere in this activity.'
8
Often one's age, experience, and general understanding will prevent
his comprehension of a danger and will serve to defeat his re-
quired consent.'9
A large number of jurisdictions hold that the assumption must
be freely and voluntarily made, the doctrine being denied where
the plaintiff has no reasonable alternative to his chosen course.
20
The point at which plaintiff must have a reasonable alternative
varies among the jurisdictions. Some courts hold the plaintiff to
have made his election when he entered the dangerous activity, 21
while still others say the choice arises when plaintiff became or
should have become aware of the defect.22 In any event, once one
gains knowledge of a risk and consents thereto, the fact that he
may later forget it will not bar the application of the doctrine.
23
One of the first reported cases arising in a skiing context and
passing upon assumed risk is the Wright case, wherein the plaintiff
was injured when she collided with a tree stump covered with
snow. The court, turning its decision upon the doctrine of as-
sumption of risk, stated:
In this skiing case, there is no evidence of any dangers
existing which reasonable prudence on the part of the
defendants would have foreseen and corrected. It isn't
as though a tractor was parked on a ski trail around a
corner or bend without warning to skiers coming down.
It isn't as though on a trail that was open work was in
progress of which the skier was unwarned. It isn't as though
a telephone wire had fallen across the ski trail of which the
defendant knew or ought to have known and the plaintiff
did not know.
The trail at the point of the accident was smooth and
covered with snow. There were no unexpected obstructions
showing. . . . To hold that the terrain of a ski trail down
a mighty mountain, with fluctuations in weather and snow
conditions that constantly change its appearance and slip-
periness, should be kept level and smooth, free from holes
or depressions, equally safe for the adult or the child,
would be to demand the impossible. It cannot be that
there is any duty imposed on the owner and operator of
a ski slope that charges it with the knowledge of these
mutations of nature and requires it to warn the public
against such.
2 4
The most recent decision discussing assumption of risk in a
skiing setting is Kaufman v. State.25 In that case, plaintiff, 16
16 Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk, 20 Harv. L. Rev. 14 (1906).
17 Kleppe v. Prowl, 181 Kan. 590, 313 P.2d 227 (1957).
1 Bruce v. O'Neal Flying Service, 231 N.C. 181, 56 S.E.2d 560 (1949). See also the Wright case,
supra note 9 at 791, wherein the court stated: "The plaintiff, in hitting the snow covered stump as
she claims to have hit, was merely accepting a danger that inheres in the sport of skiing."
19 6 L.R.A. 733 (Mass. Sup. Ct., 1890).
20 Ridgway v. Yenny, 223 Ind. 16, 57 N.E. 2d 581 (1944).
21 Bohlen, supra note 16 at 16.
22- Kleppe v. Prowl, supra note 17.
23 Southern Pac. R.R. v. Berkshire, 254 U.S. 415 (1921).
24 Wright v. Mt. Mansfield Lift, supra note 9 at 791.
25 Supra note 10.
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years of age and an expert, competitive skier who had skied at this
particular area three or four times in prior seasons, was injured
when one of his skis caught on a rock. P had ridden a chair lift to
the top of the ski area and started skiing down a path leading to
a main trail. He testified that when he started down this path,
he noticed the snow cover was not sufficient to remove the sharp-
ness of the rocks. He stated he did not particularly desire to ski
after having observed the general condition of this path. It was
also shown he was between two hundred and three hundred feet
down the path at the time of the mishap, and could have walked
to the top of the mountain and returned to the base of the ski area
via the chair lift.
The court, in its search for applicable authority, drew from
the case of Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., Inc.,26 in which
the plaintiff was injured while riding on a moving belt up an
inclined plane. It was common for patrons to be unable to main-
tain their balance on this ride because of the movement of the belt,
and were often thrown backward or to one side. When plaintiff
stepped on the belt, he felt a sudden jerk and was thrown to the
floor, along with others. The court said such a fall was foreseen.
The judge in the Kaufman case quoted the famous language of
Chief Justice Cardozo in the Murphy case:
Volenti non fit injuria. One who takes part in such a
sport accepts the dangers that inhere in it so far as they
are obvious and necessary, just as a fencer accepts the risk
of a thrust by his antagonist or a spectator at a ball game
the chance of contact with the ball. The antics of the
clown are not the poses of the cloistered cleric. The rough
and boisterous joke, the horseplay of the crowd, evokes of
its own guffaws, but they are not the pleasures of tranquil-
lity. The plaintiff was not seeking retreat for meditation.
Visitors were tumbling about the belt to the merriment
of onlookers when he made his choice to join them. He
took the chance of a like fate, with whatever damage to
his body might ensue from such a fall. The timorous may
stay at home.
• * ' Nothing happened to the plaintiff except what
common experience tells us may happen at any time as the
consequences of a sudden fall. Many a skater or horseman
can rehearse a tale of equal woe.
27
In the hypothetical posed, did P have knowledge of the injury
producing defect? In applying the above stated principles, it would
be reasonable to assume, considering P's intermediate skiing pro-
ficiency, that at the time he entered into this relationship with
the defendant area operator, he had full knowledge that such
dangers as he encountered inhere in skiing. However, it is doubt-
ful that he was then aware of this particular danger. The evidence
indicated he had skied throughout the day on this trail and was
unaware of the defect.
P, in the hypothetical situation, may be able to distinguish the
Kaufman case, if his cause of action arises in a jurisdiction requiring
26 250 N.Y. 479, 166 N.E. 173 (1929).
27 Id., 166 N.E. at 174.
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knowledge of the particular defect, in that the plaintiff in the
Kaufman case knew of the lack of adequate snow cover and of
the likelihood of injury caused by colliding with a rock. The
hypothetical situation is dissimilar in that P was unaware of the
defect. There were only one half dozen such bare spots with rocks
exposed on the entire trail, which would indicate a more than ade-
quate snow cover. The Wright case is also distinguishable from the
hypothetical posed in that the plaintiff in the Wright case, while
she might have had knowledge that such defects inhere in skiing,
was unaware of the existence of an accident causing defect.
A plaintiff may be confronted with a situation wherein knowl-
edge of a defect is to be imputed to him, on the basis of a state-
ment made by the court in the Kaufman case:
Those who engage in the sport of skiing necessarily
recognize the fact that there are risks involved. In a
case such as the instant one, where they are transported
up a mountain in order that they may ski down on open
trails or slopes, they are enabled to see the prevailing con-
ditions so far as the presence and the amount of snow
on the terrain is concerned.
28
A plaintiff faced with this problem should take into consider-
ation the fact that most courts are generally unfamiliar with skiing,
which the above statement serves to illustrate. The snow cover
under a ski lift is ordinarily not packed and is often quite deep,
thereby covering the natural terrain. The snow on a ski trail is
usually packed, meaning there is a greater chance that rocks and
other obstacles will be exposed. Usually the ski lift transports
skiers up the mountain out of sight of most of the trails; as a
consequence, the skiers are unable to judge for themselves the
general snow conditions on a ski trail until they actually reach
their intended trail. Moreover, wind, sun and other elements may
remove a substantial amount of the snow cover in the trail area
whereas these same elements may not affect the snow under
the lift.
Consider now the requirement of a free and voluntary choice,
with a reasonable alternative left for a plaintiff in addition to his
chosen course. In the hypothetical situation, was there such a
choice?
In the hypothetical, P clearly had an alternative to going skiing
- he could have stayed home. This view finds support in the
Murphy case where it was stated "The timorous may stay at
home. ' ' 29 The other position in this regard hinges upon whether P
must have a reasonable alternative after discovery of the danger.
This position would find support in the Kaufman case.3 0 A court
rendering a decision upon this point should consider first that P,
in the hypothetical posed, had skied at this particular ski area the
entire day and was unaware of the defect; and second, that this
danger was in such a hidden position that P was unaware of its
existence until he was upon it and unable to avoid it. Any holding
in this re~ard is, of course, dependent upon the view a particular
28 Kaufman v. State, supra note 10, 172 N.Y.S.2d at 282.
29 Supra note 26, 166 N.E. at 174.
30 Supra note 28.
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court takes as to when an individual must have a choice relative
to the mishap.
In an attempt to distinguish the Kaufman case from the hypo-
thetical situation on this point of a voluntary choice, P should note
the reliance the court in the Kaufman case placed on the Murphy
case, wherein Chief Justice Cardozo stated "one who takes part
in such a sport accepts the dangers that inhere in it so far as they
are obvious and necessary .... -31 In applying this statement, one
must take into consideration the facts of the Murphy case as dis-
tinguished from those of the hypothetical situation. If the Murphy
case is applicable, can it truly be said that a defect, such as a rock
exposed above the surface of the snow, is necessary to the sport
of skiing? Can it reasonably be said that this particular defect was
obvious to the plaintiff?
Another distinguishing factor pertaining to the voluntary choice
requirement is that in the Kaufman case the plaintiff was not more
than three hundred feet down the path when he suffered his
injury. It was also brought out that the plaintiff, after observing
the general lack of snow, no longer desired to ski and could have
returned to the base of the ski area via the chair lift. On the basis of
this evidence, the plaintiff had a reasonable alternative to his chosen
course. The hypothetical posed is dissimilar in that a "T-bar" lift
was utilized, which is decidedly different in its operation from a
chair lift. At a ski area where a "T-bar" tow is employed, a skier
is unable to return to the bottom of the ski slope by means of the
tow. The alternative to riding the lift back down the mountain has
now been removed. It hardly seems reasonable to compel a skier
to walk a mile's distance to the base of the area, since walking in
deep snow is quite difficult. The plaintiff who is injured as a re-
sult of having to ski down under such circumstances is in a much
better position to argue lack of a voluntary choice. This same
argument would also be available where a skier had skied part way
down a mountain and encountered a sudden lack of snow.
D. Reliance on Warnings Customarily Employed
Setting aside the discussion relative to the duty to warn an
invitee as imposed on the occupier of premises, and the discussion
of assumed risk, there is one additional argument a plaintiff can
31 Supra note 26, 166 N.E. at 174.
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advance in a situation such as that posed in the hypothetical. Many
courts hold that where a defendant has no duty to warn the public
of a danger, and the plaintiff, a member of the public, is injured
as a result of that danger, the plaintiff cannot recover.3 2 These
courts have gone on to say, however, that while there may be no
duty on the defendant to warn of the danger, once he volunteers
to do so and the public has come to rely on this warning, an in-
jured plaintiff may recover for his damages, if he has relied on
defendant's past warnings.
33
Applying this principle to the skiing context, the plausibility of
such an argument can readily be seen. At many ski areas through-
out the country the ski area operators erect warning signs or de-
vices notifying skiers that a certain danger exists. Again setting
aside the previous discussion pertaining to the duty to warn, once
this practice of warning is established and the skiing public has
come to rely on such warnings, the defendant area, operator has
opened himself up to possible liability, and has also conditioned or
eliminated the defense of assumption of risk. Whether this argu-
ment will be accepted by a court will, of course, depend upon
the view the court has taken in the past in this regard.
E. Avoidance of Liability by a Ski Area Operator
How can an area operator best guard against liability in view
of the general discussion relative to warnings and assumed risk?
It would seem that the most effective way a ski area can place the
risk upon the individual skier is to remove the guesswork for the
skier. The simplest and most efficient method to accomplish this
is through the utilization of signs or other warning devices.
The State of New York, operator of the ski area involved in
the case of Morse v. State,34 advanced the argument that signs
placed in the area served as an adequate warning. The court's
answer to this was:
It [the State] should have known that such signs
are not sufficient. In every group such as it invited to
here assemble there are those who can not resist the
temptation of a sled run down the more open ski slope.
Sledding is often indulged in by the young for the thrill
of its speed and danger. To them signs mean little. The
stronger the prohibition, the greater the temptation.
35
This early position would seem to carry less weight today in
view of the current tendency to hold the skier to have assumed the
risk of dangers which he has knowledge of and consents to assume.
However, if it is found to be an obstacle in a subsequent action, it
is entirely possible it will be distinguished in that the signs in the
Morse case were a warning to sledders to avoid the ski slope and
not warnings to skiers of the dangers created by sledders.
Nevertheless, for purposes of promoting safety as well as avoid-
ing liability, it is good practice to utilize warning signs or devices
in a ski area. Signs should be employed to apprise each skier of
32 Pritchard v. Liggett and Meyers, 295 F.2d 292 (3rd Cir. 1962); Erie R.R. v. Stewart, 40 F.2d 855
(6th Cir. 1930).
3 Ibid.
34 Supra note 11.
35 Id., 29 N.Y.S.2d at 37.
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the degree of proficiency required to negotiate a particular trail, as
well as separate signs or devices, i.e. warning flags or snow fences,
warning of dangers existing on these trails, in so far as they are
known to the occupier or discoverable through the exercise of
reasonable care.
It would seem that the ideal utilization of signs would include
the following: (1) a large map of the ski area posted in a con-
spicuous place, probably in the main building at the base of the ski
area, indicating thereon the location of and the degree of skill re-
quired for each ski trail and a designation of the ski lifts serving
each trail; (2) a sign at the bottom of each ski lift indicating the
names and types of trails served by the particular lift; (3) a sign
at the top of each ski lift indicating the location of each trail and
the degree of proficiency required thereon and (4) a similar sign
at the top of each trail. Each skier should be advised, when he
purchases his ticket entitling him to use the facilities provided, that
signs are posted throughout the ski area for his benefit.
36
While it has been suggested that signs be employed for various
purposes throughout a ski area, it should be noted that these signs
must be conspicuous but not in a position that endangers skiers.
The flag indicating a bare spot of course cannot be placed other
than in the main part of the trail. In this situation, it would seem
best to construct such a flag on a thin stick, or something that will
give way, should a skier come in contact with it.
The use of such a warning system as outlined, would be an
important factor in any subsequent litigation where a question of
assumption of risk and negligence for breach of a duty to warn is
raised.
III. AREA OF INVITATION
Most jurisdictions hold that the status of invitee is retained so
long as the visitor is within those portions of the premises which
an invitee's purposes may reasonably be anticipated to take him,
or cause him to believe are open for his benefit.3 7 However, once he
enters a part of the premises which would not lead him to reason-
ably believe it is open to him, and is not in fact open to him, this
status terminates.
38
At many ski areas, particularly those in the Western United
States, the terrain is quite rugged. Many dangerous clearings ap-
pear to be trails taking off from a main trail. In such a ski area,
the skier would appear to have almost free rein to travel anywhere
he chooses, reasonably believing this portion of the premises is
open to him and thereby retaining his favored status. It may also
be that the run for the ski jump starts from the edge of a main
trail, giving the appearance of a smaller trail leading off the main
trail.
These areas are usually not intended by the area owner to
be used by the typical skier. To insure against a skier entering one
of these forbidden areas to his injury, and to place the risk of
liability upon the skier, it would seem that a warning sign or device
36 Lebkeucker v. Pennsylvania R.R., 97 N.J.L. 112, 116 Atl. 323 (1922).
37 Annot., 14 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1118 (11. Sup. Ct. 1908).
38 Loney v. Laramie Auto Co., 36 Wyo. 339, 255 Pac. 350 (1927).
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should be posted in a conspicuous place near the entrance to the
closed area, indicating that the area is closed.
IV. COLLISIONS WITH OTHER SKIERS
The National Ski Patrol System was created about 25 years ago,
comprised of volunteers, to provide first aid and assistance to in-
jured skiers. 39 However, the Patrol is becoming more a group of-
men and women who, upon completion of a rigorous course of
training, patrol the ski slopes to assist the injured, but also take
the responsibility of maintaining safety on the slopes. 40 At every
ski area thoughout the United States, there is a constant problem
of a ski area's liability for the acts of an individual skier who con-
tinuously skies out of control, thereby endangering the other
patrons of the area.
There have been numerous cases passing upon the occupier's
duty to provide attendants to protect his invitee.4 1 In the typical
business where people classified as invitees gather in the form of
crowds, it is generally held that, save extraordinary circumstances
indicating a likelihood that a customer may suffer injuries at the
hands of a crowd, there is no duty to provide attendants. 42 In the
amusement park setting, the courts have often held the occupier
liable for injuries inflicted accidentally, negligently or intentionally
upon the invitee by third persons, provided the occupier had suffi-
cient notice and time to correct this danger, or could have done so
through the exercise of reasonable care.
43
Throughout the reported decisions in these two settings, as
well as in other contexts, a plaintiff, to recover for his injuries,
must prove that the defendant occupier had a duty to provide at-
tendants and that the failure to provide attendants was the proxi-
mate cause of his injury. 44 Applying these principles to a skiing
case, it would seem that there is a duty placed upon the ski area
operator to control the habitually reckless skier, particularly where
the area operator is aware of such conduct. Whether the failure to
provide attendants, assuming there is a duty to provide attendants,
was the proximate cause of a plaintiff's injury will, of course, be
a question of fact for the jury.
Skiing does not present a situation wherein reckless conduct
is necessary or called for; quite the contrary. A warning under
these circumstances would seem to be inadequate. The only course
left would be to grant the privilege to ski to the individual subject
to revocation for continuous carelessness, 45 with enforcement left
to the Ski Patrol. To date little has been done to correct this un-
necessary hazard.
The application of these principles would place somewhat of a
greater burden upon the area operator in that more Ski Patrolmen
would be required. Quite possibly courts faced with this problem
will draw from the authority of other areas of the law and find
this additional burden necessary, in view of the resulting benefits.
39 Denver Post, Oct. 28, 1962 (Empire Magazine p. 26).
40 Wright v. Mt. Mansfield Lift, supra note 9.
41 Annots., 20 A.L.R.2d 8, 84 (1951); 18 A.L.R.2d 904 (1949).
42 Ibid.
43 Hughes v. St. Louis Nat. L. Baseball Club, 359 Mo. 993, 224 S.W.2d 989 (1949).
44 Smith v. Kroger Grocery and Baking, 339 III. App. 501, 90 N.E.2d 500 (1950).
45 Annot., 20 A.I.R. 8, 21 (1951).
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